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OBJECTIVE 
This paper provides recent cross-national evidence of the impact of the great recession 
on fertility in Europe in the context of the recent decade. 
 
METHODS 
Using data from the Human Fertility Database (HFD), from Eurostat, and from the 
OECD database, we employ fixed-effects modeling to study how changes in 
unemployment rates have affected birth rates across Europe.  
 
RESULTS 
We find that countries that were hit hard by the recession show reduced fertility when 
compared with a continuation of recent trends, especially at younger ages.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Our results indicate a strong relationship between economic conditions and fertility. 
However, there is variation by region, age, and parity suggesting the importance of life 
course and institutional factors. 
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1. Recent fertility development in Europe: Between trend reversal 
and economic crisis  
The relationship between economic conditions and fertility is one of the classic research 
questions in family demography. Since the work of Malthus, much of the empirical 
literature on the determinants of fertility dynamics has been motivated by the idea that 
economic hardship and labor market uncertainties will cause people to postpone or 
revise their fertility plans (e.g., Adserà 2004; Sobotka, Skirbekk, and Philipov 2011; 
Hofmann and Hohmeyer 2012; Schmitt 2012). Since the global financial crisis swept 
across Europe starting in 2007, there has been renewed interest in the question of 
whether increasing unemployment rates and growing labor market uncertainties will 
have repercussions for fertility development.  
Unlike previous recessions and economic upheavals, the current recession is 
hitting Europe after a period during which the age at childbearing had continuously 
increased. Although a flattening out in the age at first childbearing has been reported for 
some European countries, it has leveled off at a relatively high level. Furthermore, the 
financial crisis hit Europe at a time when many countries had just started to see modest 
increases in their period fertility rates (Goldstein, Sobotka, and Jasilioniene 2009). In 
Greece, for example, an increase in the total fertility rate (TFR) that began at the turn of 
the century came to a halt in 2009 when the Greek economy started to crumble. From 
2010 to 2011, Greece saw a decline in total fertility from 1.5 to 1.4. A similar reversal 
in positive fertility trends occurred in Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Romania and Spain. Most remarkable were the developments in Latvia: 
When unemployment rates skyrocketed, fertility rates plummeted from 1.6 in 2008 to 
only 1.3 in 2011. Meanwhile, the neighboring country of Lithuania, where 
unemployment increased at a similar pace, did not experience any strong reaction in 
annual birth rates over the same period. In Portugal and Italy, which were also harshly 
affected by the recession, the TFR has also not yet reacted to the surge in 
unemployment thus far. The Nordic countries of Europe, which were only mildly 
affected by the recession, saw an unexpected but very uniform decline in total fertility 
in 2011 (see Figure A1 in appendix).  
This overview suggests that changes in fertility in response to the crisis have not 
been universal. It shows that fertility rates have declined in response to the crisis in 
several countries. In other countries, the economic crisis disrupted the positive fertility 
trend that began around the turn of the century. This positive trend has largely been 
attributed to a gradual end to fertility postponement, which had suppressed annual 
fertility rates (Goldstein, Sobotka, and Jasilioniene 2009). Researchers also noted that 
many European countries had implemented family-friendly policies prior to the onset of 
the crisis, which may have created an environment that is more conducive to fertility 
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(Thévenon 2011; Fagnani 2012). Ideational changes, particularly a resurgence of more 
traditional family values among the recent cohorts, have also been cited as potential 
reasons for the reversal in fertility trends (Goldstein, Kreyenfeld, and Rößger 2012). 
Thus, there appear to be important concomitant forces currently pushing fertility rates 
upwards, and these forces must be taken into account when assessing the impact of the 
economic recession. In order to understand how the economic recession is affecting 
fertility in Europe, it is important to consider how fertility would have developed in the 
absence of the crisis.  
 
 
2. Method: How can we account for the overall trend in fertility? 
In this paper, we seek to provide macro-level evidence on the role of the economic 
crisis in recent fertility dynamics in Europe. In our analysis, economic conditions are 
measured by the level of unemployment. Unemployment was chosen among other 
macroeconomic indicators as a proxy for the economic conditions and uncertainty faced 
by potential parents. For the purposes of this study, we have assembled fertility data for 
the period 2001–2010 and unemployment indicators for the period 2000–2010. The 
data come from the Human Fertility Database, Eurostat, and the OECD database. We 
wished to include more recent data from 2011 into our analysis, however many 
countries have updated their population counts in response to the new census estimates. 
For a few countries we were able to obtain corrected age- and order-specific fertility 
rates for the entire inter-censal period. For other countries, however, we were only able 
to retrieve corrected TFR-values for the period 2000–2011, but not corrected age-
specific fertility data. Due to the break in the time series for many countries, we were 
unable to use fertility rates through 2011 in the multivariate model. However, we do 
report corrected TFR-values up to 2011 in the descriptive representation of general 
fertility trends in the appendix, when available. 
The method we apply is fixed-effects modeling (Allison 2009). Fixed-effects 
modeling aims to identify causal mechanisms by exploiting within-country variations. 
A particular feature of our analysis is that we try to account for the overall trend 
governing fertility development in Europe. Obviously, it is very difficult to tell how 
fertility would have developed in the absence of the economic crisis. However, a large 
body of literature suggests that tempo effects are among the major factors responsible 
for suppressing fertility rates in recent decades (e.g., Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002; 
Sobotka 2004; Frejka and Sardon 2007; Goldstein, Sobotka, and Jasilioniene 2009). In 
order to understand fertility development, it is important to account for the 
postponement of fertility and the tendency for continued increases in birth rates at older 
ages among cohorts who postponed births at younger ages.  
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The dependent variable in our investigations is the age-specific fertility rate fk(x,t) 
for country k at age x and time t. In order to consider the underlying fertility trend 
associated with postponement, we insert a linear time trend. We also interact the time 
trend with country dummies in order to account for the fact that the tempo effect is 
likely to follow a different pattern across countries (for a similar specification used in 
the context of divorce rates, see Friedberg 1998). In order to depict the economic 
conditions in a country, we use the unemployment rate in the previous year. The 
dependent variable fk(x,t) and the major independent variable (lagged unemployment) 
are transferred into log format to allow us to interpret the estimates as elasticity. This 
leads us to the following specification:   
 
ktxktxkxkxk
unempttxf ,,,1,, )log()),(log(     
 
Analyses are done for all birth orders combined, as well as separately for birth 
orders one to three. Unfortunately, we do not have order-specific data for all of the 
countries (see Table A1 in appendix). Therefore, the order-specific analyses had to be 
conducted with a restricted number of countries and a limited time frame. Having the 
five-year age-specific fertility rate as the dependent variable produces multiple 
observations per country and year. In order to correct for this, we use robust standard 
errors.  
We have conducted various types of sensitivity analysis. Instead of the linear time 
trend, we have used a quadratic time trend. In another specification, we have used age-
specific unemployment rates instead of overall unemployment rates. We have also 
conducted an analysis in which we used the TFR instead of the ASFR as a dependent 
variable. We have also experimented with the period of coverage, restricting the 
analysis to the most recent time period. It is noteworthy, however, that the overall 
pattern that we have obtained from these different specifications is similar to the one 
reported in this paper (see additional material). 
 
 
3. Results 
Figure 1 reports the results from an analysis for all birth orders combined, as well as 
separately for birth orders one through three (see additional material for full models). 
Focusing first on the pattern for all of the birth orders combined, we find a clear and 
consistent negative impact of unemployment on fertility rates (Panel 1). The impact 
seems particularly strong at younger ages, which suggests that first births are most 
strongly affected by increasing aggregate unemployment rates. Support for this notion 
can be found in Panel 2, which shows the order-specific pattern. Unemployment 
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reduces first birth rates at all ages (except for age 40–44). However, the greatest impact 
is found at younger ages. The first explanation could be that young people can more 
easily revise their fertility plans. The second reason could be that unemployment is 
higher for younger people. In fact, analyses with age-specific unemployment rates (see 
additional material, Table 9) reveal similar patterns. However, youth unemployment 
and overall unemployment are strongly related, making it difficult to disentangle age-
specific effects. The pattern for the higher birth orders is more irregular than that of first 
births. No association seems to be present between unemployment and second birth 
behavior at younger ages. At ages 30 and higher, people seem to revise their plans if 
unemployment rates increase. The third birth pattern (Panel 4) is very irregular. Some 
negative effects of unemployment on third birth rates are, however, visible at ages  
35–44. 
Figure 2 displays the analysis by country cluster for all parities combined. Because 
the Southern and Eastern European countries have been affected more severely by the 
recession than other parts of Europe, we assumed that analyzing the differences 
between regions could help us determine whether the strength of the recession affects 
the relationship between economic conditions and fertility. Furthermore, the regions 
broadly fall into classical welfare state clusters, giving us the opportunity to understand 
the effect of institutions. Figure 2 shows clear regional variation. In the countries in 
which the economic crisis has not yet led to great economic hardships (i.e. most 
Western and Northern European countries), unemployment does not appear to have had 
a substantial impact on fertility. The welfare state appears to insulate fertility decisions 
from the relatively small variations in the economy seen in the Northern and Western 
European countries over the past decade. However, this does not mean that a larger 
recession might not impact fertility in these countries. Indeed, the experience from the 
fertility reaction in response to the Swedish finance and labor market crisis of the 1990s 
suggests the opposite (Andersson 2000). We find a significant relationship between 
fertility and unemployment in the Southern, Eastern and Central European countries. 
The strong association found in these areas suggests that unemployment does matter for 
fertility choices; fertility tends to decline when economic conditions deteriorate 
severely.  
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Figure 1: Estimated elasticities of unemployment on fertility, results by age 
and birth order 
 Panel 1: All births Panel 2: First birth 
 
 Panel 3: Second birth Panel 4: Third birth 
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Figure 2: Estimated elasticities of unemployment on fertility, results by age 
and country cluster 
 Northern Europe Western Europe 
 
 Southern Europe Central and Eastern Europe 
 
Note: Central and Eastern Europe: Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia. Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
Ireland. Northern Europe: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden; Southern Europe: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain. 
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4. Conclusions 
The overall findings of this study suggest that the recent economic crisis has left an 
imprint on European period fertility patterns. For some countries, it put a halt to the 
positive fertility trend that had started to develop. In other countries, we see significant 
declines in period fertility. The results from the fixed-effects modeling that controls for 
differences between countries and trends over time showed that unemployment rates are 
closely associated with fertility development. In particular, fertility rates at younger 
ages seem to respond to adverse economic conditions. This finding is compatible with 
the idea that fertility plans can be revised more easily at younger ages than at ages 
closer to the biological limits of fertility. However, it is important to note that 
unemployment has reduced fertility in Southern Europe in particular. Southern 
European countries such as Italy and Spain are known for their unstable job entry 
patterns, and the recession has further exacerbated the problems young people face in 
this region (Müller and Gangl 2003; International Labour Organization 2012). A 
combination of the depth of the recession and the institutional arrangements in Southern 
countries appear to make the relationship between the economy and fertility the 
strongest in these regions. 
When we look at the results for higher order births, the pattern becomes less clear-
cut. It is only at older ages (30–44) that unemployment lowers second birth rates. At 
younger ages, unemployment does not seem to matter for second birth choices. We may 
be able to explain this pattern by considering the particularities of the population 
exposed to the risk of having a second or third child at younger ages. These women are 
usually a select group who are less educated and less career-oriented. Women who are 
at risk of having a second or third child at older ages are, to a greater extent, highly 
educated individuals who might respond more sensitively to economic downturns in 
making their reproductive choices (Kreyenfeld 2010). However, this is pure 
speculation; research on the micro-level would be useful to further investigate this 
issue. 
A particular feature of this study is that we have accounted for the overall fertility 
trend by inserting country-specific linear time trends in the fixed-effects regression. 
Such a linear time trend seems reasonable for the one decade we consider. However, 
other specifications may be possible, and the correct way of accounting for the tempo 
distortions in period fertility is clearly open to debate. In the absence of counterfactuals, 
it is impossible to know for sure how fertility would have developed in the absence of 
the crisis. There are many other issues we were unable to address in this short 
descriptive paper. Most importantly, we suspect that the welfare state context is an 
important intervening factor that mitigates the impact of economic conditions on 
fertility. The Baltic countries might be quite telling in this respect. Whereas Latvian 
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fertility rates markedly declined in 2009, fertility in the other Baltic countries, which 
introduced quite generous parental leave schemes shortly before the economic crisis, 
showed no major downturn in fertility. In order to fully understand the repercussions of 
the economic crisis on Europe’s fertility development, we need to consider that family 
policies may have softened the adverse affects of the crisis. Beyond the regional welfare 
state typology that we employed in our paper to capture the social policy context, 
further analysis should incorporate more detailed measures of the family policy context. 
We have shown that fertility of the Southern European countries most rigorously 
responded to the economic crisis. With our analysis we were, however, unable to tell 
whether this may be due to limited family policies or to the fact that the governments in 
Southern Europe were unable to protect their younger members from economic 
uncertainties during the early life course. The macro-level analysis in this paper 
provides a first step in the analysis of the recession, which we hope will be buttressed 
by a continuation of the tradition of detailed micro-level studies in the years ahead. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Countries included in the analyses 
Country Unemployment rate Age-specific fertility  Order and age-specific fertility
*)
  
Austria Eurostat 2000-2010 HFD 2001-2010 HFD 2001-2010 
Eurostat 2011 
Belgium Eurostat 2000-2010 Eurostat 2001-2010 Eurostat 2001-2009 
Bulgaria Eurostat 2000-2010 HFD 2001-2010 HFD 2001-2010 
Croatia Eurostat 2002-2010 Eurostat 2002-2010 Eurostat 2002-2010 
Czech Republic OECD 2000-2008 
Eurostat 2009-2010 
HFD 2001-2010 HFD 2001-2010 
Denmark Eurostat 2000-2010 Eurostat 2001-2010 Eurostat 2001-2005 
Estonia Eurostat 2000-2010 HFD 2001-2010 HFD 2001-2010 
Finland Eurostat 2000-2010 HFD 2001-2009  
Eurostat 2010 
HFD 2001-2009 
Eurostat 2010 
France Eurostat 2000-2010 HFD 2001-2010 Eurostat 2001-2006 
Germany Eurostat 2000-2010 HFD 2001-2010 HFD 2009-2010 
Greece Eurostat 2000-2010 Eurostat 2001-2010 Eurostat 2001-2010 
Hungary Eurostat 2000-2010 HFD 2001-2009 
Eurostat 2010 
HFD 2001-2009 
Eurostat 2010 
Ireland Eurostat 2000-2010 HFD 2001-2009 
Eurostat 2010 
HFD 2001-2009 
Eurostat 2010 
Italy Eurostat 2000-2010 Eurostat 2001-2010 NA 
Latvia Eurostat 2000-2010 Eurostat 2002-2010 Eurostat 2002-2010 
Lithuania Eurostat 2000-2010 HFD 2001-2010 HFD 2001-2010 
Netherlands Eurostat 2000-2010 HFD 2001-2009 
Eurostat 2010 
HFD 2001-2009 
Eurostat 2010 
Norway Eurostat 2000-2010 HFD 2001-2009  
Eurostat 2010 
HFD 2001-2009 
Eurostat 2010 
Poland Eurostat 2000-2010 Eurostat 2001-2010 Eurostat 2001-2010 
Portugal Eurostat 2000-2010 HFD 2001-2009 
Eurostat 2010 
HFD 2001-2009 
Eurostat 2010 
Romania Eurostat 2000-2010 Eurostat 2001-2010 Eurostat 2001-2010 
Russia OECD 2000-2010 HFD 2001-2010 HFD 2001-2010 
Slovakia Eurostat 2000-2010 HFD 2001-2009 
Eurostat 2010-2010 
HFD 2001-2009 
Eurostat 2010-2010 
Slovenia Eurostat 2000-2010 HFD 2001-2009 
Eurostat 2010 
HFD 2001-2009 
Eurostat 2010 
Spain Eurostat 2000-2010 Eurostat 2001-2010 Eurostat 2001-2010 
Sweden Eurostat 2000-2010 HFD 2001-2010 HFD 2001-2010 
Switzerland OECD 2000-2010 HFD 2001-2010 HFD 2001-2010 
U.K. Eurostat 2000-2010 Eurostat 2001-2010 NA 
 
Note: 
*)
 Age-specific fertility rates by birth order for which the Eurostat database is indicated as the source were computed by the 
authors using the Eurostat data on live births and population on January, 1st.  
Sources: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database;  
http://www.humanfertility.org;  
http://stats.oecd.org/. 
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Figure A1: Total Fertility Rate (TFR) and unemployment rate by country 
 Austria  Belgium 
 
 Bulgaria  Croatia 
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Figure A1: (Continued) 
 Czech Republic Denmark 
 
 Estonia  Finland 
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Figure A1: (Continued) 
 France  Germany 
 
 Greece  Hungary 
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Figure A1: (Continued) 
 Ireland  Italy 
 
 Latvia  Lithuania 
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Figure A1: (Continued) 
 Netherlands Norway 
 
 Poland  Portugal 
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Figure A1: (Continued) 
 Romania Russian Federation 
 
 Slovakia  Slovenia 
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Figure A1: (Continued) 
 Spain  Sweden 
 
 Switzerland U.K. 
 
 
Note: Belarus, Ukraine and Serbia are not represented, as we lack official unemployment rates for these countries. TFR* represents 
the predicted TFR based on five-year extrapolations. 
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